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ABSTRACT
Gender inequality is one of the few fundamentally persistent inequalities within society,
especially in the United States. This thesis will use a Marxist-feminist approach to explore the
impact of the United States’ capitalist market economy on gender-specific public and private
life structures. Specifically, how inequality is exacerbated as women transition to motherhood.
This paper hypothesizes that a mandated paid parental leave would alleviate some of this
‘second burden’ by encompassing fathers in its eligibility. We formulate a difference-indifference model to estimate the causal effects of two current states who mandate paid parental
leave and evaluate the average treatment effect when compared to the untreated group. Since the
results do not provide support for the hypothesis, we present possible explanations for the
limitations of the model and the data.

Keywords: Gender Inequality, Parental Leave, Policy
JEL Classifications: B24, C31, H31, I38, J16
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INTRODUCTION
Around the world, new parents receive the support of government policy as they embark on
important responsibilities attached to raising their country’s next productive workforce. The
process reproduces itself, but historically, not everyone has been required to contribute.
Nonparents have been able to enjoy the external benefits of child rearing as it generates the
future workforce; they’ve also been able to evade the costs by not being the ones required to
raise the child. Paid parental leave has been established in many countries as a wage
replacement that allows new parents to care for and bond with their newborn after birth. This is
an important stage of the child’s life in terms of care, but especially important for the parent as
well; for first-time parents, they must navigate their way through uncharted territory. Paid
parental leave is a benefit that provides new parents (including fathers) time away from work for
a certain number of weeks to navigate their new role (U.S. Department of Labor 2021). The
level of wage replacement at which the policy supports parents varies significantly depending
on the country you live in. This is a relevant issue, since parents can no longer obtain an income
during their time away from work and must bear the additional financial burden of essential
child-specific costs.
While most countries offer paid leave for mothers, and about half offer paid leave for fathers,
the United States has been slow to follow the trend. Mothers are considered to be the main
caretaker and are usually offered some type of job-protected leave at the national level;
however, it is unpaid. Fathers have even less of an opportunity to take time off from work in
this situation, unless their employer offers the benefit. Some states have paid leave mandates,
which are funded through employee payroll taxes and administered through insurance programs.
Social policies that include both parents help resolve aspects of gender inequality, such as the
discrepancy in childcare labor provided by (and expected from) mothers and fathers. For
centuries, women have been designated as caretaker. A different approach that rejects
stereotypical gender roles will allow to level the division of childcare labor. Scholars have
indirectly supported this, citing that mothers and fathers can provide similar parenting given
similar circumstances (Risman 1987). The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the effects of a
paid parental leave policy on the hours dedicated to childcare labor at the aggregate level. This
6

thesis hypothesizes that a paid parental leave policy incentivizes parents to take off from work
to provide childcare to their newborn. Thus, there is a need for a more progressive policy
approach.
Many scholars have analyzed the topic of gender inequality through an historical, social, or
economic lens to understand the differences between women and men in society. This thesis
adopts a multidisciplinary lens to argue that a paid parental leave policy would be beneficial to
both genders, i.e., both parents.
The first section will elaborate on Marx’s theories on capitalism and exploitation. Marxist
feminism is discussed as an extension of Marxist theory, and then as an application to the role of
women in a capitalist economy. It will be argued that women are exploited by the collective
capitalist, and their exploitation is exacerbated and solidified through societal norms, which may
persist without government intervention. The history of gender norms within the United States
is used to obtain a firmer grasp of the problem and then used as an insight for quantitative
analysis.
The main assumption of this thesis is that changing the functions of formal institutions will lead
to a change in informal institutions – namely, the traditional expectations regarding the division
of unpaid household responsibilities such as childcare. Supportive family-oriented policies,
already implemented in other countries, signal a more even distribution of childcare labor once
parental leave encompasses both parents. In fact, the amount of leave a father takes is a
significant factor in how soon mothers return to work and can again invest in their career (Naldi
et al 2021). Sweden has successfully developed the idea of a dual-breadwinner household that
offers evidence that mothers can be workers as well as caretakers, and fathers can be caretakers
as well as workers (Miller 2021).

CHAPTER 1: THE NECESSITY
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “ex·ploi·ta·tion [as]: an act or instance to make use of
meanly or unfairly for one's own advantage” (Merriam-Webster 2022). To economists, the term
7

refers to Karl Marx, a political economist that analyzed exploitation and class conflict within
capitalism. Marx argued that the working class, the proletariat, is always pushing to improve
their working conditions and increase their pay; capitalists, on the other hand, exert the opposite,
because their goal is to maximize their profits. While workers don't enjoy being exploited, they
are forced to engage in this relationship or else they won't survive. As a result, “workers sit in a
necessary but contradictory relation to the capitalist drive to provide and accumulate surplus
value” (Ferguson 2017).
The relation is necessary because of the previous societal transition from collective land
ownership to private ownership, that consequently forces workers to sell their labor to obtain
wages and meet their necessary level of consumption to sustain themselves. Capitalists must
hire human labor power to reap profits from the process of value production. Thus, both sides
are dependent on one another.
The contradiction, however, arises from the need of the capitalist to have a competitive
advantage amongst its peers, which requires them to exploit the working class as much as
possible. The inherent conditions of capitalism allow it to reproduce itself over time (Marx
1887). The subordination of the ruled is consensual, because they have adopted the moral,
political, and cultural values, put forth by the ruling class, as the standard social norm. The lack
of structural change on conditions, and their continuous engagement only leads to the
persistence of exploitation. An outside force must step in to intervene and prevent the recurrence
ad infinitum limiting the hegemony of capitalism.
The analysis presented by Marx can be extended to segments within a capitalist economy that
also sustain and reproduce the exploitation. The analysis can be applied to women’s
contribution to the reproduction of the household and the sustainability of the labor force, as de
facto designated caretakers.
At the basic level, capitalist societies are founded upon unequal class relations as well as on the
cultural and economic devaluation and externalization of care work (Müller 2019). Certain
elements of care work are relegated to the private sphere and remain largely unpaid and
invisible within the methods of production. Another term for a society that functions this way is
8

a capitalist–patriarchal system since the divisions of labor discriminate against women (Moos
2017). Within the economic structure of society, women simultaneously remain outside of the
capitalist mode of production, while assigned a crucial role in its reproduction. Several authors
have demonstrated that unpaid socially reproductive activities incur a cost—in terms of
necessary time and effort—that is uncompensated by capital (Laslett and Brenner 1989; Folbre
2002; Bakker 2007).
It should be emphasized that household labor, including childcare, constitutes a significant
amount of socially necessary production. Nevertheless, in a society based on commodity
production, it is not usually considered “real work” since it is outside of the market and is not
tradeable (Benston 2019). Thus, the collective capitalist can rely on unpaid domestic and care
work from the members of working-class households, particularly women (Menon 1982; Moos
2017). Engaging in this situation allows for the conditions to persist, reinforcing the dogma that
‘the woman’s place is in the home’ (Menon 1982).
1.1 The Connection Between Market, Household, And Politics
This particular approach requires a key understanding that ‘the production of goods and services
and the production of life are part of an integrated process’ (Ferguson 2017). There can be no
separation between life within the household and life outside of it. For mothers, unpaid
household work enables the reproduction of existing workers as well as the development of
children as future workers. Whether cooking, cleaning, or child rearing, women’s labor is
disregarded or ignored even though it is vital for the existence and reproduction of labor
markets. Human labor, unlike other commodities, cannot simply be bought; it requires
deliberate actions to sustain its value as an input in capitalist production. The inequality
produced by capitalism, therefore, becomes borne by women by default. Because of this social
relation evident between production and reproduction, we cannot afford to view the market
economy, or household life, as separate from politics since “the market itself is a political
construct” (Chang 2002).
Chang grounds his case on the fact that the emergence of any market is not possible without
help from the state (Chang 2002). Following this logic, the boundaries of the market are set by
the state as it oversees its functioning.
9

Let us consider child labor. In the United States, child labor was banned through an intervention
of the state that limited the market’s options for labor. However, in other countries, child labor
is allowed given that profit maximization and economic growth take precedence over other
social values and cultural norms.
In both situations, the norm is accepted under the nation-state’s context and regarded as
‘correct’ given the society’s conditions and values. Chang, among other political economists,
argues that one must view capitalism not only by its private sector structure but by the political
system that fosters its reproduction (Chang 2002). The private sector’s incentive is to perform as
profit maximizing agents; the public sector’s role is to facilitate the bounds in which individuals
interact.
1.2 The Burden Of Parenting
Parental labor involves the raising of a dependent child and has unique characteristics that can
be analyzed through Marx’s theory. Domestic production – such as cooking and cleaning –
result in benefits only for household members. Parental labor is an inherently different type of
work because it produces positive externalities that reach beyond the household. However, the
value of these benefits is not reflected in the cost to produce them; only parents are burdened
with their cost.
Figure 1 depicts the ratio of essential childcare costs to the consumer price index from the late
1970s to 2020. Initially, essential childcare costs (such as tuition) were relatively cheaper than
average consumer costs. However, since the end of 1982, the cost of childcare has increased
significantly. By the end of 2019, essential childcare costs were three times as expensive as
general items that the average person paid to sustain oneself. The costs borne by parents not
only are unique to their position but are also growing more rapidly than the costs of other goods.
The ratio of essential childcare costs to consumer price index illustrated in Figure 1 portrays a
growing, and uneven, burden for parents that non-parents do not have to endure. Thus, it has
become increasingly important for every citizen to share the cost of child rearing.
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Figure 1: Ratio of Essential Childcare Costs to Consumer Price Index

From the capitalist point of view, the unpaid aspect of socially reproductive work within the
household creates a positive externality. Capitalists benefit from the use of labor power without
fully paying for its reproduction. For the working class, a number of negative externalities can
emerge since they bear the additional, and uncompensated, social costs of reproduction,
especially when the structure of the labor market requires that several members of the household
work long hours for low pay (Moos 2017). The low social cost, relative to the large social
benefit, results in an under-provisioning of the support needed for children to become future
productive workers of society. If the source of investment does not equate to the final effect of
the investment, the market is inefficient and could benefit from government intervention (Penne
et al 2020). The discrepancy between benefits and burden regarding parental labor gives
significant preference to capitalists in the mode of production, as well as nonparents in general.
To remedy this, the government can assume its advisory role in the market system and mark
boundaries, or, in this case, implement benefits that promote a more equal distribution of
parental labor (Folbre 2020).

CHAPTER 2: CONTEXT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
The history of the United States contains societal norms that have played an important part in
defining gender roles.
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2.1 Pre-World War II
Before World War II, social expectations placed fathers in the role of primary breadwinners and
mothers as primary caretakers. The economic burden of income-producing labor fell heavily on
men, while the social and private burden of sustaining the whole household, and the working
man, fell upon women. This structure was reproduced culturally through advertisements, TV
shows, and magazines.
Advertisements of household items, such as vacuum cleaners, presumed that only women would
use them, while simultaneously assuming that a man would be purchasing the goods (Alcantra
2011). Through these forms of media, society instilled in women a fear of being unfeminine
because that is not what the husband desired of them (Friedan 2010). Magazines targeted
housewives, perpetuating gender biases: education, a career, or general independence, was less
important than being feminine and caring for their husbands and families. Fictional stories often
depicted heroines as working women, but only at the expense of losing their husband and
family. Targeted audiences – mainly women who did not work – were inclined to avoid the
potential repercussions involved with looking for economic activities outside of their home
(Friedan 2010).
The prevailing culture also stressed the importance of a one-income household. As a result,
women, including mothers, assumed a subordinate role to their male counterparts that led to
different standards, expectations, and opportunities. The main outcome was limited economic
opportunities but also a reduced or null participation of women in politics. While many voters
criticized the ability of female politicians to manage both a career and family, no one reverted to
this thinking when assessing the abilities of male candidates (U.S. Government Printing Office
2007). Women were constantly defending themselves when asked about participating in any
activity beyond the private sphere.
2.2 World War II As A Catalyst
The Second World War allowed women to enter the workforce, replacing the men who left the
labor market to serve in the military. Sixteen million men mobilized to fight for their country,
forcing firms to hire female labor, thus normalizing women’s participation in the labor force
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(Acemoglu et al 2004). After the war, many women left the labor force, but it didn’t last for
long.
The women’s rights movement of the 1960s helped to concretely shift the perception of men
and women. Many women, determined to make their lives less constrained, actively
demonstrated and challenged the long-standing traditional notions of motherhood and marriage
(Friedan 2010). Before the movement, the typical employee was male, who often “had support
systems at home, usually a wife and family” (Romzek 1991). The movement successfully led to
an increase in economic independence for women. Given the emergence of dual-income
households, the single-income household dynamic was no longer apparent. For working women,
work and family responsibilities had begun to overlap, since much of the household burden was
still on them. The situation was more acute for working mothers.
By the end of the 1960s, a shift of the burden of paid labor contributed to an increase in
economic equality within the workplace. The public conception of a typical household involved
a career for both partners. Many public images of what a typical household looked like started to
involve both partners having a career. Although rarely depicted in society, the divorce rate rose;
single mothers became more common, and less stigmatized (U.S. Government Printing Office
2007).
It can be argued that the women’s rights movement dissolved the economic class division by
allowing women to pursue whichever career they desired. However, the acceptance of women in
the labor force did not result in an increase of the contributions made by men in their
households. There was a broad refusal by men to share the burden of domestic work.
Consequently, women came home to a “second shift” of labor: the first being economic
activities, and the second burden being housework that, in fact, increased gender inequality
(Bianchi et al 2012). Arlie Hochschild defines the “second shift” as the additional 40 hours,
approximately, of work performed by mothers in addition to the income-generating labor they
perform in the observable labor market (Hochschild and Machung 2003).
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2.3 Strengths And Shortcomings Of Advancement In The Labor Market
Women’s participation in the labor force has increased dramatically since the 1960s, regardless
of whether they have children at home – a stark difference from the previous standard of
mothers being solely caretakers (see Figure 2). Educational attainment followed, and the
number of women in the labor force with a college degree quadrupled over a similar period
(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2021). As recently as January 2020, before the onset of the Covid-19
pandemic, 47.8% of the employed labor force was women (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020).
The share of two-parent households in which both parents work full-time has also increased
significantly in the past half century. The number now stands at 46%, up from 31% in 1970
(Pew Research Center 2015).
Figure 2: Women’s Labor Force Participation Rate

The overall work hours between men and women without children has equalized for the most
part in the latter half of the 20th century. Overall work hours have historically been defined as
the summation of labor hours and housework hours (Baxter Hewitt and Haynes 2008).
However, beyond housework, there is a wide gap on the hours devoted to childcare between
mothers and fathers: “The equality among married couples diminishes as they transition to
parenthood, a transition that solidifies women’s responsibility for household work and men’s for
wage work” (Baxter Hewitt and Haynes 2008). Indeed, the time use patterns of husbands and
wives have converged in recent years. However, the average market hours and wages of women
with young children remain substantially lower than those of men and of childless women
(Lundberg and Rose 2000; Misra and Strader 2013).
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This likely is exhibited through the parents’ own perception of career advancement after
becoming parents. A 2015 study done by the Pew Research Center found that 41% of working
mothers believe that being a mother has made it harder to advance in their career, while only
20% of working fathers said the same (Pew Research Center 2015). Even though it’s obvious
that women make up a higher percentage of the labor force, household and child-specific labor
is still primarily their responsibility. When they work outside their home, women must fulfill
their responsibilities in both their house and their job. Women, particularly married women with
children, participate in the labor force only when they continue their first responsibility at home
(Benston 2019).
Despite the advances on gender equality in the United States, the societal norm of mothers being
the primary caretakers persists. A recent survey by Miller (2020) found that one in four men
favored a home arrangement where women stayed at home while they worked full-time. They
were also no more likely to divide household work equitably than their older couple
counterparts (Miller 2016). Even though men contribute to relatively more unpaid household
work now than in 1960, on average, men still perform about an hour less per day (Miller 2016).
As long as work in the home remains a matter of private production, it is very likely that women
will carry a weekly workload of 80 hours.

CHAPTER 3: PAID PARENTAL LEAVE
A policy that financially supports both parents in their child rearing roles could increase gender
equity by providing higher levels of social well-being and support. Furthermore, the expenditure
on children, measured in time or monetary value, is not rewarded enough.
3.1 Theories On The Decision To Parent
Mainstream economists hold the position that mothers derive nonpecuniary benefits due to their
altruistic behavior, rationally accepting a tradeoff via lower wages, or even no wages, as an
efficient economic exchange. In their vision, the short-run decision to become a mother results
in a temporary loss of wages. In the long-run, the lifetime potential earnings of mothers
decreases due to the loss of on-the-job experience. The feminist critique of this theory argues
15

that mothers do not act out of altruism, but out of a moral commitment and a sense of
responsibility. Female bodies are the only ones who can birth a child; however, a biological fact
does not provide the basis that all women must assume complete social responsibility. As the
labor market expanded and women’s labor force participation increased, the opportunity costs of
children also rose, especially for mothers (Laslett and Brenner 1989). It would be unwise to
assume that women will continue this trade-off in the same magnitude over time without
adequate support to offset the inequality of opportunity.
3.2 A Gap In Provisioning
Parents supply the labor required for child rearing. However, they are not the only ones
receiving the benefits. Since all citizens reap the benefits of children as contributors to society,
the fairness principle argues in favor of sharing the costs of children between nonparents and
parents (Olsaretti 2013). The argument is grounded in the claim of parental justice, which is
providing justice to parents for their work in human reproduction of society. It has two central
assertions: parents’ creating and caring for children generates benefits for those outside the
family relationship.
Despite a general awareness of the strenuous circumstances of working parents, many families
still lack adequate support to meet their needs. Social Security and public debt guarantee that
United States citizens benefit from the earnings of future working-age adults. However, not all
citizens contribute equally to the care of these future adults (Folbre 1994). There must be a link
between the well-being of today’s children and tomorrow’s society (Trzcinski and FinnStevenson 1991). Under-provisioning of parental services is bound to occur if the market is left
free to fulfill them, since the social benefits from children exceed private benefits. Most
employers do not include the possibility of their prospective employee becoming a parent when
negotiating labor contracts, and it is not likely that employees will include it in the discussion
for fear of discrimination (Ruhm 1998).1 The resulting underinvestment can inversely be viewed
as an additional burden placed on households with children. In fact, many families with young
1

Ruhm comes to this conclusion even with The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, an amendment of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The amendment prohibits sex discrimination in the workplace on the basis of
pregnancy (U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission 1978).
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children experience prolonged forms of economic stress that result in higher risk of poverty and
unequal opportunity to adequately participate in society (Penne et al 2019). A 1998 study by the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services suggests that 25% of all the instances where a
family falls into poverty begins with the birth of a new child.
The cost of childcare in the United States can be covered by foregone earnings or by hiring a
caretaker out of the household, increasing the economic pressure on families with children. If
the cost of having children becomes too difficult to endure, families will decide to not have
children, which can be detrimental to the long-run growth of the economy, among other things
(Waldfogel 2001).
Parental labor should be considered a public good because it is nonexclusive and has many
external economy-wide benefits that benefit society, contributing to the productivity and growth
of the future domestic economy.
Some scholars have called for the public provision of childcare facilities as a means to realize a
gender-equal society (Esping-Anderson 1999). Given the political and historical context of the
United States, the public provisioning of services is openly questioned and widely opposed.
Furthermore, the common design of social programs in the country follows a trend that
stigmatizes, discriminates and offers minimum support to eligible families (Black and Sprague
2016; Floyd et al 2021). The provision of care has been left to the market, which has severely
undervalued workers while also widening the gap of families that can’t afford care services.
Yamane (2021) suggests that these [ineffective] gender equality policies have created a
vulnerable group of under-paid care and domestic workers, especially those in the childcare
industry.
3.3 Childcare And Paid Leave As Supports
The data from countries with both childcare and parental leave policies show that their
interaction is possible and, in fact, yields positive results since they encompass the entirety of
the child’s early life. Childcare policies offer support for nonparental care by either subsidizing
the care that parents select, or by providing care directly through a public program.
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Parental leave policies, on the other hand, are aimed at the first few weeks of a newborn’s life,
when the tension between work and child rearing are more intense (Waldfogel 2001). If a
country offers little parental leave but more generous childcare subsidies, parents are more
likely to return to work earlier and place children in childcare. Alternatively, one can expect
extensive paid leave to increase the likelihood of parents staying home with their child and
purchasing less nonparental childcare (Waldfogel 2011).
One important difference between the two are their external effects of childcare labor on
children when it is not delegated to a third-party. Paid leave would, theoretically, allow both
parents to bond with their child while also becoming more efficient at performing childcare
labor. If childcare labor is delegated, parents would fail to benefit from obtaining valuable new
skills while also losing the opportunity to create a strong family nucleus.
A paid parental leave policy would offer support to new parents while providing a framework
for childcare work to be more evenly distributed. The policy should encompass both parents,
giving them time to adjust to parenthood and make decisions during early childhood that are
crucial for development. An important decision to be made during the earliest stages of a child’s
life is the eventual placement of the child in childcare services. By temporarily removing the
commitment to the workplace, parents can now tend to their child in the immediate term while
also preparing for their eventual return to the workforce (Hawkins and Roberts 1992). The
offering of paid parental leave can thus have profound long-term effects on children’s wellbeing (Hewitt Strazdins and Martin 2017; Daundasekara Beauchamp and Hernandez 2021).

CHAPTER 4: WHY NOT BOTH?
The Patriarchal model assigns men the role as the head of household and breadwinner. As a
result, policy proposals are founded on the assumption that the household member who
contributes the most monetary resources has the most bargaining power, enabling them to opt
out of household labor (Lundberg and Pollack 1996). However, data from 2019 shows that
mothers are now the sole or primary breadwinner for their families in 41% of households
(Glynn 2019). In the United States, mothers no longer stay at home. They are participating in
18

income-generating activities on top of the pre-existing tasks in the household, including
childcare (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2021).
The prevailing relative resistance to paternity leave, as opposed to maternity leave, reflects the
stigmatization created by the market towards special considerations to care work.2 Men who
identify as more concerned about their household, may be labeled as ‘less ambitious’ than their
peers (Hawkins and Roberts 1992). In a survey conducted by Erin M. Rehel, “the most
commonly cited reason for not taking more extended time off was a concern for how this would
be perceived by supervisors, colleagues, and, sometimes, clients,” pointing to the perseverance
of the breadwinner identity among men (Rehel 2014). The stigma remains even as men have
become less likely to be the breadwinner in dual-income households. There is no more
economic dependency on fathers to secure the financial means of the family; it is rather a joint
effort by both parents to meet the family’s needs. The reasons for fathers to want to remain in
the workplace are diminishing as more women take on full-time roles and become primary
income generators within their households.
The fear of career consequences, social disapproval, or economic constraints prevent fathers
from taking advantage of paternity leave. Even in countries with the most generous parental
leave policies, such as Sweden, the social and professional qualms still remain (Haas 1990). We
suggest that this is perhaps one of the reasons the effectiveness of the policy is doubted. The
government’s support and regulation of the policy at a level above the individual firm would
prevent professional repercussions from occurring. The policy would have to be accompanied
by job-protection laws that prohibit discrimination against those wanting to use the opportunity
of paid leave when eligible.
Unlike women, men are able to maintain, and even strengthen, their ties to employment after the
arrival of a new child. Authors describe this concept as the fatherhood premium (Lundberg and
Rose 2000; Glauber 2008; Killewald 2013; Misra and Strader 2013; Waite and Denier 2015;
Weeden et al 2016). The idea is that men enter parenthood in a structurally different way than
mothers because they do not have to entirely leave their workplace, while women must, even for

2

In the name of inclusion, many states have started to adopt the term “paid family leave.”
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a short period. Women, as a result, solely take on the burden of childcare in the period
immediately following the arrival of the child. Traditional parenting patterns contribute to the
gendered division of labor when a child arrives to a household, even in relatively egalitarian
relationships (Baxter Hewitt and Haynes 2008).
Several studies have found that when men are required to be primarily responsible for all
aspects of childcare, they are able to do so. In fact, they ‘parent’ in ways similar to mothers and
are more likely to adopt parental behaviors that closely resemble a mother’s care (Risman
1987).

CHAPTER 5: THE BARE-BONES MINIMUM
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (commonly referred to as FMLA) offers 12
workweeks of job-protected unpaid leave annually to any eligible worker for the birth of their
child, the placement of a child for their adoption or foster care. To be eligible, one must be
employed for at least 12 month and have 1,250 hours of service during the previous 12-month
period. Firms with less than 50 employees are excluded from the coverage. To obtain leave,
employees are required to give at least 30 days’ notice of the need for leave to which they are
entitled, when foreseeable (103rd Congress 1993). The Act includes the care for an elderly
family member or someone with a serious health condition.
The current policy structure does not cover every worker in the United States; only employees
who work for a company with greater than 50 workers and have 1,250 work hours in the prior
year are eligible for unpaid leave (Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor).
Therefore, only 59% of all U.S. workers are eligible to be covered by FMLA, while the rest
have no legal right to any type of leave to care for a new child (National Partnership for Women
and Families 2016). Only 39% of those eligible for leave under the FMLA can afford to take
unpaid leave. For working parents of color, the situation is even worse: 25% of Hispanic
working parents and 35% of African American working parents are eligible, and financially
able, to take FMLA unpaid leave (National Partnership for Women and Families 2016). For
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single mothers, the situation provides virtually one outcome. Without other means of support,
it’s nearly impossible for them to take off from work and care for a child (Folbre 1994).
While the demographics of the labor force have dramatically changed, the current policies in
place have not kept up. The dynamics of the household have shifted; many women participate in
the labor force. Among those who hold full-time jobs during their pregnancy, 59% return to
work within three months after giving birth. The absence of a paid parental leave policy
prohibits many working mothers from continuing their full-time employment, thus creating a
financial, time-intensive burden.

CHAPTER 6: PAID LEAVE POLICIES IN THE REST OF THE WORLD
The United States is lagging behind other high-income countries regarding a mandated federal
paid parental leave. In most high-income countries, working parents are guaranteed at least 14
weeks of paid parental leave, in line with ILO standards (International Labour Organization
2014; Livingston and Thomas 2019). The average length of maternity leave offered globally is
29 weeks, longer than the current 12-week period offered by the United States. Globally, the
average length of paternity leave is 16 weeks, while there is currently no time off given to new
fathers (Miller 2020). The total duration of paid leave exceeds nine months in most nations.
(Rossin-Slater Ruhm and Waldfogel 2013). In most countries, including the United States,
working parents are offered a specific percentage of their wages as an allowance while they
partake in leave. Only a select few offer the full-rate salary, which is only offered to mothers
(World Population Review 2021).
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Figure 3: Countries with Paid Maternity Leave Policies

Source: World Population Review 2022

More than half of all countries across the globe offer some form of paternity leave in addition to
maternity leave (Livingston and Thomas 2019). About half of the countries that offer paternity
leave provide financial support to fathers through cash transfers — typically a percentage of
their most recent annual earnings, up to a maximum threshold. In most cases, the policy is
funded through social security programs or disability insurance funds which are paid by
mandatory employee contributions via taxation (Miller 2020). Of those who offer paid paternity
leave, many rich countries provide an average of 12 weeks for new fathers. Countries such as
Japan and Sweden have found ways to offer options for more than a year (Miller 2021).
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Figure 4: Paid Paternity Leave in OECD Countries

Source: Kolmar 2022

A study using panel data from twenty-four different countries ranging in type of welfare state
found that, regardless of the type of social welfare state, paid parental leave is most effective
when there is a combination of high income replacement (50% or more of earnings) and a
period of leave greater than two weeks (O’Brien 2009). It was also found that a longer paid
leave policy, specifically at least 10 months long, would significantly improve health outcomes
for women and children, child development outcomes, and women’s employment (Ruhm 1998;
Waldfogel 2001). In Quebec, policymakers understood the lack of incentive for fathers and
sought to counteract this with relevant policy adjustment. Prior to the implementation of
Quebec’s current leave policy in 2006 (which provides five weeks of time away from work with
replacement wages at 70 percent of one’s salary), 32% of fathers took leave. By 2011, this
number dramatically increased to 76%, showing that policy does impact a parent’s decision to
take leave (Rehel 2014).
6.1 Characteristics And Innovative Tactics
Germany and Spain offer 50% of wages and two or more weeks of leave. Finland and Norway
also offer extensive paternity leave programs. In Iceland, the program offers replacement wages
for mothers and fathers at 80% of their prior year’s salary and the government splits the total
time off into three parts: one-third must be taken by mothers, one-third by fathers, and the
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remaining time can be used discretionarily (O’Brien 2009). Norway implemented an adjustment
similar to the one seen in Iceland and found an increase in leave take-up rates. In the years prior
to the introduction of a father’s quota, less than four percent of fathers took some parental leave.
Only a few years later, however, the rate was over 70% (Brandth 2018). For a more detailed
explanation of Norway’s paid parental leave program, see Appendix A1.
Allocating time specifically for parents has been a recent adjustment in the policies of other
countries as well. In Sweden, the government intervened in the market to guarantee that men
take the paid leave, thus mandating that fathers take one month of total paid leave (Haas 1990;
Haas and Hwang 1995). This is a progressive step toward equality that corroborates Chang’s
proposal that the market and government should not be viewed as separate entities (2002).
The European Union (EU) has explicit legislation that acknowledges the limited opportunity for
either parent to take off from work and tend to their caring responsibilities within the household.
In this regard, the EU has required each member state to offer a minimum paid parental leave of
four months to at least one parent. The directive states that paid parental leave is a worker’s
right that should be protected and upheld by the state. Replacement wages offered by each
government should be ‘adequate’ to increase the incentive to workers who are parents,
especially men. Because the effect of the leave is the same for both parents, the EU encourages
each state to offer the same allowance at the national level to all parents (Directive of the
European Parliament 2019). The legislation also offers job protection and worker’s rights to
retain an equivalent position in the workplace. Compared to Europe, the lack of policies in the
United States for those with work and family responsibilities is woefully inadequate (Tucker
2006).

CHAPTER 7: CURRENT LEGISLATION
In the United States, at the federal level, the FMLA only offers unpaid leave to eligible workers.
Federal workers have access to 12 weeks of paid parental leave under the Federal Employee
Paid Leave Act (FEPLA). The absence of federal legislation means that the solution resides in
the market. There are some states, and private companies, however, that offer greater support to
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parents in the form of paid time off for newborns and newly adopted children. A number of
firms have felt competitive pressure to voluntarily offer paid leave policies so they can attract
more productive workers and a few elected officials have also proposed legislation to improve
the conditions within their districts.
As of 2017, only three states had implemented paid family leave – New Jersey, California, and
Rhode Island. Rhode Island’s size and relatively new policy (enacted in 2014) creates a problem
for modeling its effects. Although there is enough data in theory for each year, when isolating
the interaction term for parents living in Rhode Island with a newborn or newly adopted child,
there are years in which there are no observations. Therefore, some interaction terms within the
vector are left blank, causing our model to have holes when interpreting the coefficients: of the
18,224 observations to perform a case study on Rhode Island, only 64 of them are new parents
residing in Rhode Island. If one considers the vector from 2003 to 2019, there are not enough
parents surveyed from Rhode Island to gather results.
Other states have plans to begin parental leave coverage: Colorado in 2024, Connecticut in
2022, and Oregon in 2023. We will focus on New Jersey and California, the two states in the
United States with paid parental leave policies in place for the longest period.
7.1 States Of Focus
California was the first state to mandate paid parental leave, providing up to eight weeks of
partial wage replacement for workers spending time at home to care for a newborn child.
California’s Paid Family Leave law was implemented in July of 2004 and offered replacement
wages at 60% of the worker’s prior average income.3 It is an expansion of California’s State
Disability Insurance program and is funded through employee payroll contributions. It does not
provide job protection for workers while they are on family leave, as it is assumed workers are
covered by FMLA (Rossin-Slater Ruhm and Waldfogel 2013).

3

The benefits of this policy were increased in 2020 to a benefit period of 8 weeks and wage replacement of 6070%. This change is not considered in this thesis since it falls beyond the scope of our analysis (Employment
Development Department: State of California 2020).
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New Jersey’s Family Leave Insurance law took effect in July 2009. The state’s law offers
replacement wages at 66% of prior average earnings for up to six weeks annually. It is an
expansion of New Jersey’s Temporary Disability Insurance program and is funded by employee
payroll contributions. Like California’s program, it does not offer job protection for workers
while on family leave (NJ Department of Labor and Workforce Development). For a more
detailed explanation of New Jersey and California’s paid leave insurance, see Appendix A2 –
A3.
While policy specifics such as replacement wage level varies slightly across states, each
program is structured similarly, enabling a comparison. While the policies do not directly ensure
job protection, the FMLA does this as an overarching legislation if both are used simultaneously
(Byker 2016).
Each policy has an upper bound threshold for weekly benefits given to an individual. It is
important to note that the programs were implemented by building on temporary disability
programs and administrative structures that had existed already for decades (National
Partnership 2016).
In each case, the contributions to the employee payroll for paid leave are levied on all workers,
regardless of whether they claim dependents. This diminishes the cost for corporations, limiting
it to temporary replacement or reorganization in the absence of the eligible worker.
7.2 Previous Findings Regarding Paid Leave Effects
The literature on the effects of parental leave within the United States focuses on California
since it is the first state that enacted the policy. Several studies show how before the policy was
enacted, women giving birth experienced a sharper decline in labor force participation from
about six months before birth to about four months after birth. After the policy took effect,
women experienced a smoother and shallower interruption pattern (Rossin-Slater Ruhm and
Waldfogel 2013; Byker 2016). Supporting even brief interruptions of work could prove to have
long-term employment benefits, such as increased labor attachment, lower turnover rates, and
lower costs of temporary replacement (Byker 2016). From the corporate point of view, an
encompassing report on family support found a positive or negligible effect of the
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implementation of paid parental leave on the bottom line of businesses (National Partnership
2016).
Other studies conducted on the expansion of state paid leave laws in the U.S. found that the
policies are associated with increases in leave taken by both parents. The absolute effects were
small in magnitude, but significant when compared to the baseline rates (Ruhm and Waldfogel
2009; Rossin-Slater Ruhm and Waldfogel 2013; Baum and Ruhm 2016; Bartel et al 2018).
Support of new parents has also been shown to reduce government spending on public
assistance programs and increase labor force participation, which brings concomitant economic
gains by generating a larger tax base and increasing consumer spending (Milkman and
Appelbaum 2013).

CHAPTER 8: DATA
This analysis uses diary data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS)4 for the years 2003
through 2019 to estimate the effects of paid family leave on the amount of childcare labor done
by mothers and fathers in households with both partners present. The ATUS diary data is used
to capture the amount of time people spend doing various activities, such as paid work,
childcare, volunteering, and socializing. Individuals are randomly selected from a subset of
households that completed the Current Population Survey (CPS) and were interviewed about
their time allocation on a typical day (Bureau of Labor Statistics).
The range of years was defined to match time prior to the enactment of California’s family paid
leave, up to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. We used the IPUMS (Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series) Time Use website to extract the data from the original ATUS website. This
website harmonizes the survey data and makes it easy to select specific variables and offers the
ability to create a custom time-use variable to analyze time spent specifically on childcare for

4

The American Time Use Survey is a nationally representative U.S. time diary survey which estimates how, where,
and with whom Americans spend their time. It is the only federal survey that provides data on the full range of
nonmarket activities.
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one’s own children. The data extract builder is called ATUS-X and is a collaboration of the
IPUMS Center for Data Integration and the Maryland Population Research Center (Hofferth et
al 2021).
The working sample for the analysis comprises mothers and fathers who are employed full-time
and living in a household with a child that is between the ages of 0 to 5 at the time the survey
was conducted. This enables us to identify new parents who would be eligible to take paid
parental leave once it is offered. We choose age 5 as the cutoff for children because we must
consider a larger age bracket to obtain enough observation points for meaningful discussion.
While this is not a strong reason and undoubtedly creates a problem with the data, it must be
done to have enough observations.
A Note on the Data
In order to optimize the analysis, the data was manipulated to define the composition of our
target population. For full details on the manipulation of the data to obtain the working sample,
see Appendix A4.

CHAPTER 9: EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
This thesis conducts a set of two difference-in-difference (DD) models for two case studies:
New Jersey and California. A DD model is a quasi-experimental design that assesses the
difference between a treated and control group over time to estimate the effect of a specific
intervention (Goulding 2011; Shafrin 2006). It identifies the average treatment effect on the
treated group by comparing how much the outcome – in this case, childcare labor – changes
before and after treatment, when compared to the scenario in which no treatment existed.
Because the counterfactual is unobservable, it is typically approximated by using the outcome
change over the same time period among the control units. The goal is that each model estimates
the treatment effect by comparing the pre- and post-treatment periods of the treated group to the
pre- and post-treatment periods of the untreated group, holding other variables fixed (see
Appendix A5 for a canonical 2x2 DD construction).
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The question our analysis seeks to answer is: does the opportunity to take paid parental leave
result in a significant change of the level of childcare labor? One specification of the model
focuses on time allocation toward childcare labor separated by gender of parent, which will
demonstrate any convergence toward gender equality within the parenting dynamic following
policy implementation.
A difference-in-difference model is a useful technique to use when randomization at the
individual (state, in this case) level is not possible. To effectively use this model, we must
discuss the most important assumption of it: parallel trends. The assumption requires that
without any treatment, both treated and untreated groups would have followed, on average, the
same path. This is a rather strong assumption, and inherently untestable because we know that
one group was treated, and that cannot be changed. To indirectly test this assumption, the
standard approach would be to compare outcome trends before treatment takes place. If those
trends are indeed parallel, it would support the assumption that parallel trends hold. To do this,
we use year as a vector to separate the effects both in the pre- and post-treatment period. Here,
we can see if a particular year has a significant impact on childcare labor that is exogenous to
the treatment, at least in the pre-treatment period. By separating the effects of each year, we can
indirectly test if there is a pre-treatment trend. There will be no apparent time trend if the pretreatment year variables have statically insignificant coefficients.
Most critics of difference-in-difference estimation raise points of concern for models with
variation in treatment timing across multiple groups and multiple periods (Goodman-Bacon
2021); however, our model focuses on a singular case of treatment and therefore only has one
point in time where the treatment is enacted. Another concern arises where already-treated
groups are used as controls in the model; then, changes in the treatment effects over time
downwardly bias the estimator (Goodman-Bacon 2021). Since we are using treated states
separately, there is no problem of heterogeneity in timing; thus, the concern raised by
Goodman-Bacon does not apply here.
States are heterogenous due to their political nature, economic prowess, location, etc., thus, our
model includes state specifications to reflect the time invariant differences. This should be
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considered because most choices, such as enacting laws, are not randomized but rather actual
decisions made by real people, and therefore endogenous to potential outcomes.
The following identifies our simple difference-in-difference model:
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 = 𝛽! + 𝛽" 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽# 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟$ + 𝛽% 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟$ ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽& 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝜇
Where cchrperweek is the hours of childcare labor performed weekly, treated is a dummy
variable for the treated state, year is a vector of year dummy variables, year*treated is the
interaction vector for the treated group in each year, state is a dummy variable for all other
states, and 𝜇 is the error term. We employ a vector for the time periods because we assume that
the fixed effects of a policy enactment will taper off eventually. We expect to see a noticeable
change in the number of weekly hours worked in performing childcare labor in the years
immediately following the treatment point ceteris paribus. After the initial shock, the
expectation is that these effects will flatten out as the fixed effects converge toward a new
equilibrium point given the change in policy.
Next, we separate the first specification by mother and father to assess the policy impact on each
parent with a young child present in the household. To do this, we construct two subsets of the
data, denoted by the subscript m and f, respectively:
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘' = 𝛽! + 𝛽" 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑' + 𝛽# 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟'$ + 𝛽% 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑' ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟'$ + 𝛽& 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒' + 𝜇'
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘( = 𝛽! + 𝛽" 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑( + 𝛽# 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟($ + 𝛽% 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑( ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟($ + 𝛽& 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒( + 𝜇(
The second specification of our model includes other control variables while maintaining a
separation between mothers and fathers:
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘' = 𝛽! + 𝛽" 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑦𝑟𝑠' + 𝛽# 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛' + 𝛽% 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑦𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑' +
𝛽& 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑' + 𝛽) 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟'$ + 𝛽* 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑' ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟'$ + 𝛽+ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒' + 𝜇'
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘( = 𝛽! + 𝛽" 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑦𝑟𝑠( + 𝛽# 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛( + 𝛽% 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑦𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑( +
𝛽& 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑( + 𝛽) 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟($ + 𝛽* 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑( ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟($ + 𝛽+ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒( + 𝜇(
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Where educyrs is the number of years in schooling, logweekearn is one’s weekly earnings
presented in logarithmic form, and ageychild is the age of the youngest child in the household.
We assume here that higher weekly earnings will result in less childcare provided by the parent;
however, direct childcare from the parent can be substituted with childcare from a nanny or
other third-party source more easily as weekly earnings increases. The inclusion of the variable
thus eliminates downward bias in the model specification. We control for weekly earnings in
logarithmic form to understand percentage changes in weekly earnings as opposed to level
changes.
Regardless of specification, the model requires baseline data and a control group that never
experiences the implementation of a statewide parental leave policy. For the case study on
California, the control group will be the aggregation of all 50 states (and Washington, DC),
minus New Jersey and Rhode Island. For the case study on New Jersey, the sample excludes
Rhode Island and California.5
Each state qualifies as a treated group and implements a slightly different treatment effect
profile; they either vary in length, wage replacement level, or upper/lower bound threshold.
Such heterogeneity is bound to occur in a real-world event study, but since the features of each
paid leave are only slightly different – and it’s quite hard to quantify these differences in a
regression model – we ignore the slight differences and focus on the main point of the case
study. Otherwise, the model would be a single DD framework with variations in treatment
timing.
The last assumption is that states have diverse economic conditions, but humans respond to
incentive. Previous literature has shown that the opportunity cost of leaving work to perform
childcare has decreased with the advent of paid leave, increasing the rate of leave-taking (Ruhm
and Waldfogel 2009; Rossin-Slater Ruhm and Waldfogel 2013; Baum and Ruhm 2016; Bartel et
al 2018). We expect the results to be in line with previous results relating to rates of leave uptake.

5

Rhode Island is excluded because its own policy occurs during the observation period.
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9.1 California Case Study
To identify the impact of California’s Paid Family Leave on parents’ time spent on childcare in
the household, we construct a DD framework that isolates Californian residents from the rest of
the United States.6 Our data starts in 2003, and the policy is implemented in 2004, so it must be
noted that our pre-treatment period data will not be as robust as in the other case studies.

Summary Statistics (CA Case Study)
Variable
YEAR
AGEYCHILD
female
EDUCYRS
logweekearn
CCHrPerWeek
Vector
Year=2003

N
20242
20242
20242
20242
20242
20242
N
2049

SD of X^2

Min

Max

2009.942
19529.721
2.191
8.365
0.429
0.495
10.775
63.743
6.643
9.986
53.206
3911.372
% of Obs.
Vector (cont.)
10.12% Cali=1,Year=2003

Mean

2003
0
0
1
-4.605
0
N
215

2019
5
1
17
7.967
198.917
% of Obs.
1.06%

Year=2004
Year=2005
Year=2006
Year=2007
Year=2008
Year=2009
Year=2010
Year=2011

1362
1407
1338
1278
1349
1296
1301
1158

6.73%
6.95%
6.61%
6.31%
6.66%
6.40%
6.43%
5.72%

Cali=1,Year=2004
Cali=1,Year=2005
Cali=1,Year=2006
Cali=1,Year=2007
Cali=1,Year=2008
Cali=1,Year=2009
Cali=1,Year=2010
Cali=1,Year=2011

144
127
142
143
148
140
136
110

0.71%
0.63%
0.70%
0.71%
0.73%
0.69%
0.67%
0.54%

Year=2012
Year=2013
Year=2014
Year=2015
Year=2016
Year=2017
Year=2018

1155
1045
1064
977
915
890
832

5.71%
5.16%
5.26%
4.83%
4.52%
4.40%
4.11%

Cali=1,Year=2012
Cali=1,Year=2013
Cali=1,Year=2014
Cali=1,Year=2015
Cali=1,Year=2016
Cali=1,Year=2017
Cali=1,Year=2018

106
104
119
107
112
84
74

0.52%
0.51%
0.59%
0.53%
0.55%
0.41%
0.37%

Year=2019

826

4.08% Cali=1,Year=2019

71

0.35%

Sources: Author’s Calculations; U.S. Census Bureau

The summary statistics for the data on California’s case study is shown above. There are 20,242
observations in total, with 2,082 of those observations being residents of California. For some of
the interaction terms for new parents living in California being surveyed in each year, the
number of observations is small: for example, only 74 out of 832 people surveyed in the year
2018 were new parents living in California. Nevertheless, there are enough observations to carry
out the case study. 43% of the observations are new mothers, while 57% are new fathers.

6

Rhode Island and New Jersey are also excluded since both states implement their own policies during the
observation period, albeit with a slightly heterogenous treatment.
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Table 1 shows the regression results for our first model specification. The dotted line depicts the
time at which the implementation occurs. Time and state fixed effects are included in all models
but minimized since they’re unrelated to the topic of discussion.
Table 1: CA Base Model
Dependent variable:
CCHrPerWeek
-10.540*

Cali

(5.412)
Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2004

5.939
(3.952)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2005

2.204
(3.960)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2006

4.318
(3.987)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2007

5.227
(3.902)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2008

6.219
(3.913)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2009

0.325
(4.043)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2010

6.736*
(4.083)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2011

-3.096
(4.068)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2012

2.185
(4.127)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2013

10.910***
(4.073)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2014

6.914*
(3.947)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2015

11.132***
(4.062)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2016

4.2
(3.967)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2017

-1.623
(4.195)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2018

19.334***
(4.219)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2019

0.671
(4.269)
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The 90% confidence interval of the state effects for California is -15.95 to -5.13 childcare labor
hours per week compared to all untreated states (with a mean of -10.54 hours). This result
encompasses both parents, but Table 2 reveals that it is mothers who account for this variable’s
significance. While mothers generally contribute more to childcare than fathers in terms of time,
mothers in California contribute relatively less in comparison to mothers in other states. In fact,
mothers in California contribute 7.2 to 24 hours less weekly for childcare on average ceteris
paribus (mean of 15.6 hours weekly; see Table 2). The statistic remains the same in our final
model shown in Table 3.
Table 2: CA Base Model by Sex
Dependent variable:
CCHrPerWeek
Fathers

Mothers

-1.927

-15.578*

(6.855)

(8.398)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2004

5.666
(4.763)

0.174
(6.638)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2005

1.417
(4.678)

2.536
(6.922)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2006

2.046
(4.760)

4.472
(6.804)

Cali

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2007

4.312

5.342

(4.618)

(6.791)

8.354*

-1.348

(4.683)

(6.659)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2009

-2.337
(5.059)

-2.712
(6.491)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2010

3.946
(5.025)

4.79
(6.663)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2011

-4.529
(5.019)

-6.519
(6.620)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2012

-0.897
(4.955)

2.572
(6.970)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2013

12.293**
(4.975)

2.306
(6.708)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2014

5.392
(4.803)

1.951
(6.543)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2015

10.769**
(4.932)

7.351
(6.744)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2016

2.853
(4.734)

1.793
(6.780)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2017

-5.404
(5.019)

2.976
(7.131)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2018

11.383**
(5.276)

24.623***
(6.749)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2019

-2.002

-1.028

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2008

34

The vector of interaction terms in Table 1 portrays a delay in the relationship between mandated
paid leave and hours spent on childcare labor since we do not find any relationship between the
two variables until 2010. In the period from 2010-2019, half of the years show a positive
relationship between being a new parent in California with mandated paid parental leave and
weekly hours worked dedicated toward childcare. What’s important to note is that most of the
statistical significance in the vector of years for new parents pertains to fathers’ hours worked
once we separate the parents in Table 2. However, the years which show statistical significance
are not immediately after policy implementation.
Table 3 is the most detailed model specification; it includes additional covariates while
maintaining the separation of mothers and fathers. Both parents are included, but we focus more
on the impact of fathers’ allocation of time toward childcare, because prior to the policy
implementation, mothers had already benefited from unpaid leave while fathers had not.7
Between 2013 to 2018, the coefficients of the interaction vector suggest that men increase their
weekly contribution to childcare between 17.2 to 47.6 hours (based on the 95% confidence
intervals for the years 2013, 2015, and 2018 for fathers residing in California), with a mean of
32.4 hours.
Mothers residing in California exhibit only a statistically significant change in childcare hours
worked in 2018. Although speculation, it could be that an external event occurred in 2018 which
caused mothers to allocate more time to childcare work since all other years do not reflect a
change in hours, either before or after this shock.
Figure 5 illustrates the results of the interaction vector for fathers’ allocation of time toward
childcare over the course of the survey. The 95% confidence interval for change in child care
provided shows a great amount of variation throughout the observation period. There is a
decrease in child care provided by fathers a few years after policy implementation. A decade
after policy implementation, the change in child care varies between positive and negative.

7

The advent of paid leave might have a lesser impact on mothers, but this quantifiable impact is beyond the scope
of this paper.
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In contrast, there is much more variation in mothers’ childcare hours immediately following
policy implementation (Figure 6). From 2004 to 2017, there is a steady, small increase noted by
the midpoint of the confidence interval. The large shock in 2018 is possibly from an external
event since the policy implementation is over a decade prior. One would expect an increase
shortly after 2004 before levelling off with a new equilibrium range established; however, there
might be other factors not included in the model, influencing a parent’s incentive to provide
more (or less) childcare.

Source: Author’s Calculations

Source: Author’s Calculations
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Table 3: CA Model With Control Variables
Dependent variable:
CCHrPerWeek
Fathers

Mothers

logweekearn

-0.982*
(0.511)

-6.648***
(0.451)

AGEYCHILD

-0.410**
(0.181)

-2.419***
(0.206)

EDUCYRS

0.776***
(0.108)

1.585***
(0.134)

Cali

-1.518
(6.838)

-15.003*
(8.214)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2004

5.026
(4.751)

-0.599
(6.492)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2005

1.791
(4.667)

2.25
(6.769)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2006

1.533
(4.751)

4.587
(6.654)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2007

4.169
(4.607)

5.183
(6.645)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2008

8.830*
(4.673)

-2.403
(6.512)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2009

-2.648
(5.047)

-4.852
(6.349)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2010

3.537
(5.012)

5.201
(6.517)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2011

-4.69
(5.006)

-7.343
(6.474)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2012

-0.389
(4.943)

3.2
(6.817)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2013

11.301**
(4.965)

1.018
(6.561)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2014

4.498
(4.792)

1.324
(6.399)

Cali:as.factor(YEAR)2015

10.198**
(4.922)

5.659
(6.597)

Digressing to examine the covariates included within the model, we find insightful results: as
the youngest child in the household grows older, the time spent on childcare labor decreases in
all cases, but especially for mothers (about 2.4 hours weekly as the child’s age increases
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annually). Similar results are shown for percentage increases in weekly earnings and are more
drastic for mothers. For each percentage point increase in weekly earnings, fathers supply 0.5 to
1.5 hours of childcare less per week, while mothers supply 6.2 to 7.1 hours less per week. This
shows that mothers are more responsive to wage increases. It must be noted, however, that
marginal wage benefits are likely to be at least partly endogenous. In other words, those seeking
to take time off from work have the most to gain by securing a job with higher paying wages.
Additional years of education for each parent reveals a positive relationship to childcare labor.
The mean effect is more than twice as large for mothers (1.59 and 0.75 childcare hours per
week, respectively). This result is well-known and supported by other scholars (Gimenez-Nadal
and Molina 2013; Jain 1994)
9.2 New Jersey Case Study
New Jersey’s Family Leave Insurance was enacted in 2009. The model follows the same DD
framework as California’s case study. For visual reasons, state specifications and time fixed
effects are again minimized.

Summary Statistics (NJ Case Study)
Variable
YEAR

N
18783

Mean
2009.946

SD of X^2
19568.841

Min
2003

Max
2019

AGEYCHILD
female
EDUCYRS
logweekearn

18783
18783
18783
18783

2.193
0.432
10.838
6.644

8.385
0.495
62.988
9.935

0
0
1
-4.605

5
1
17
7.967

CCHrPerWeek
Vector

18783
N

53.264
% of Obs.

3910.095
Vector (cont.)

0
N

177.917
% of Obs.

Year=2003
Year=2004
Year=2005

1909
1259
1322

10.16% Jersey=1,Year=2003
6.70% Jersey=1,Year=2004
7.04% Jersey=1,Year=2005

75
41
42

0.40%
0.22%
0.22%

Year=2006
Year=2007
Year=2008

1233
1190
1235

6.56% Jersey=1,Year=2006
6.34% Jersey=1,Year=2007
6.58% Jersey=1,Year=2008

37
55
34

0.20%
0.29%
0.18%

Year=2009
Year=2010

1196
1200

6.37% Jersey=1,Year=2009
6.39% Jersey=1,Year=2010

40
35

0.21%
0.19%

Year=2011
Year=2012
Year=2013

1083
1085
968

5.77% Jersey=1,Year=2011
5.78% Jersey=1,Year=2012
5.15% Jersey=1,Year=2013

35
36
27

0.19%
0.19%
0.14%

Year=2014
Year=2015

967
897

5.15% Jersey=1,Year=2014
4.78% Jersey=1,Year=2015

22
27

0.12%
0.14%

Year=2016
Year=2017
Year=2018

839
843
780

4.47% Jersey=1,Year=2016
4.49% Jersey=1,Year=2017
4.15% Jersey=1,Year=2018

36
37
22

0.19%
0.20%
0.12%

Year=2019

777

4.14% Jersey=1,Year=2019

22

0.12%

Sources: Author’s Calculations; U.S. Census Bureau
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The table above provides the summary statistics for the case study done on New Jersey. As
shown, some interaction vectors for new parents living in NJ do not have many observations. Of
the 18,783 observations, for example, only 22 are new parents in New Jersey surveyed in the
year 2014. While the number of observations is less than ideal, the amount for interaction term
is enough to continue with the model. 623 of new parents in the qualifying data are residents of
New Jersey. Like the CA case study, about 43% of all observations are new mothers, while 57%
are new fathers.
Table 4: NJ Base Model
Dependent variable:
CCHrPerWeek
Jersey

0.69
(6.983)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2004

-8.297
(7.636)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2005

-5.028
(7.798)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2006

-8.069
(7.916)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2007

-5.215
(7.000)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2008

3.836
(7.953)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2009

-9.852
(7.911)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2010

-15.053*
(7.737)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2011

1.228
(7.374)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2012

-2.013
(7.674)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2013

-11.272
(8.180)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2014

-2.171
(8.660)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2015

9.565
(8.472)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2016

-16.067**
(7.070)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2017

-6.412
(7.490)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2018

-4.014
(8.346)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2019

-8.474
(7.893)
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In the first specification (Table 4) there is an immediate negative impact of 7.3 to 22.8 hours
with a mean of 15.1 hours (with 90% confidence). This is counterintuitive to the policy and in
fact the opposite effect previously hypothesized. There is only one other year (2016) which
exhibits a similar result for parents living in New Jersey, seven years later from policy
implementation, so it is likely that an external shock caused this shift.
Table 5: NJ Base Model by Sex
Dependent variable:
CCHrPerWeek
Fathers

Mothers

Jersey

8.049
(9.424)

-12.37
(9.781)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2004

-17.107*
(10.115)

8.053
(10.987)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2005

-6.234
(10.356)

0.847
(11.151)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2006

-6.305

-9.784

(10.945)

(10.719)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2007

-2.027
(9.168)

-4.126
(10.499)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2008

-12.201
(10.344)

38.989***
(11.847)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2009

-15.454
(10.336)

5.314
(11.673)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2010

-11.597

-14.872

(9.897)

(12.163)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2011
Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2012
Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2013
Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2014
Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2015

-3.306

6.038

(10.512)

(9.716)

9.628

-15.983

(10.182)

(11.001)

-2.286
(10.641)

-22.385
(12.141)

*

-5.97

6.015

(11.348)

(12.614)

9.237

15.256

(11.070)

(12.425)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2016

-11.842
(9.092)

-20.052*
(11.396)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2017

-8.708
(9.526)

12.16
(12.251)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2018

1.63
(11.258)

-7.351
(11.628)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2019

-4.606

-9.643
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The model reveals that there is no time trend, which is important for our analysis. There are
minimal statistically significant variables, and the model can only explain 0.5% of the total
variation, expressed by the Adjusted 𝑅# .
When the model separates mothers and fathers (Table 5), the covariates offer little insight.
Before policy enactment, mothers likely experienced a shock in 2008 which increased their
childcare labor. However, there is otherwise no pre-treatment time trend. The post-treatment
time period shows fathers’ time allocation remaining largely the same, while the model
specification for mothers’ time spent on childcare labor reveals that in two separate years
several years after 2009, mothers decreased their time dedicated toward their children, which is
the inverse of what we expect. However, the year in which this takes place implies that there is a
separate event that causes this to occur, if not just an overestimation in the survey. While
illustrating little statistical significance among variables, the adjusted 𝑅# increases when sub
setting by mothers and fathers (to 0.9% and 0.6%, respectively).

Source: Author’s Calculations
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Source: Author’s Calculations

Including the additional covariates does not prove fruitful; there is only one statistically
significant year in the post-treatment period: mothers living in New Jersey in the year 2016
show a decrease of 7.6 to 29.8 of childcare hours, with a mean of 18.7 hours weekly (at the 90%
confidence level, shown in Table 6).
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the change in fathers’ and mothers’ childcare in each year, respectively.
Figure 7 shows that there may be a negative time trend before policy implementation, but a
relevant causality test proves this visualization to be negligible. After policy implementation, the
coefficient hovers around the x-axis, revealing that there is no impact on child care provided in
the post-treatment period for fathers. For mothers, we find a few years (2010, 2012, and 2013) to
show a decrease, while the rest of the year variables show negligible effects. There seems to be
no pre-treatment time trend, with an external shock likely occurring for mothers in 2008.
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Table 6: NJ Model With Control Variables
Dependent variable:
CCHrPerWeek
Fathers

Mothers

logweekearn

-0.706
(0.524)

-7.061***
(0.474)

AGEYCHILD

-0.469**
(0.186)

-2.560***
(0.212)

EDUCYRS

0.735***

1.775***

Jersey

(0.113)

(0.142)

7.017

-12.217

(9.402)
*

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2004

(9.539)

-17.599

10.798

(10.094)

(10.715)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2005

-6.852
(10.332)

2.06
(10.873)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2006

-5.683
(10.919)

-11.88
(10.453)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2007

-2.157
(9.146)

-3.32
(10.240)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2008

-12.733
(10.321)

38.886
(11.552)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2009

-15.173
(10.311)

7.793
(11.384)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2010

-10.084
(9.876)

-14.693
(11.863)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2011

-3.535
(10.487)

8.095
(9.476)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2012

9.121
(10.161)

-14.26
(10.728)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2013

-2.529
(10.616)

-17.591
(11.841)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2014

-4.406
(11.323)

0.216
(12.307)

Jersey:as.factor(YEAR)2015

9.605
(11.046)

9.66
(12.119)
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***

CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS
The two case studies analyzed do not offer support to our hypothesis: the implementation of
mandated paid parental leave increases the amount of childcare provided from mothers and
fathers.
The model used time allocated toward childcare as a dependent variable to assess the difference
in childcare provided pre- and post-policy treatment. The statistically significant interaction
terms for new parents living in the treated state occur too far after the treatment to reveal
causality between the event and the increase in childcare. Our estimation includes in the control
group parents who give birth or adopt a new child in other states allows for the control of trends
in economic conditions with have impacted all states regardless of location. Considering this, it
is not likely that the model would falsely attribute the increase in childcare labor hours to the
implementation of parental leave.
A critique of the model posed in this analysis involves the manipulation of data to obtain the
dependent variable: total childcare. While it seems beneficial to aggregate primary and
secondary childcare (noted in Appendix A1) to obtain policy impact on total childcare provided
by parents, it may be that either primary or secondary childcare has greater sensitivity to change
after policy implementation. Primary childcare is likely to remain relatively stable for newborns
because of the necessity to provide this care. Secondary childcare, however, may include
additional childcare that could be offered if incentivized through a paid leave policy.
10.1 Explanations For Findings
Some of the reasons that could explain our findings are: parents were not made aware of the
benefit due to lack of advertisement of the new law; the wage replacement level is too low for
parents to consider an extended amount of time away from work; the leave may not result in an
equitable distribution of care provided by a parent in the long-run; there is a sharper change in
secondary childcare provided as opposed to total childcare (the deponent variable used in this
analysis).
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Let us consider the first possible outcome. In a survey conducted in 2015, “just 36% of voters
[were] aware of [their] state’s paid family leave program” (Field Research Corporation 2015).
To obtain enough data points to adequately assess the impact of mandated paid leave, new
parents within the treated state must first have knowledge of the benefit to even consider using
it. Once the policy is well-known, we should then consider the rate of leave-taking. While we
generally had enough data points for meaningful analysis (using 30 as a rule of thumb), it is
possible that more data points could prove fruitful in future analyses.
We analyzed the average effects of taking paid leave in households with young children but are
not considering how policy implementation influences the rate of taking paid leave, undoubtedly
a limitation of our model. Indeed, the American Time Use Survey does not identify those who
utilized paid leave apart from those who did not. Therefore, the constructed model had to
analyze the impact at the state level and not the household level, grouping together parents who
took leave with those that didn’t. This is not sufficient and dilutes the impact, offering no
support to our hypothesis. Further, if one can identify those who take leave, one can also expect
to see a continuing effect in the following years if the policy results in a more even long-run
distribution of childcare between mothers and fathers.
A study that compared the difference in rates between fathers of infants in California and father
of infants elsewhere found that fathers in California are 46% more likely to take leave than the
average. However, the baseline rate of leave taking is only 2%. In this same study, mothers are
13% more likely to take leave after policy implementation. Before treatment, about 17.7% of
mothers utilized leave (Bartel et al 2018). It’s possible that some of the variation we see in
fathers’ contribution to childcare can be attributable to shifts in gender norms, especially in
California, a state that is usually identified as a progressive bastion.
The household-level rates of leave-taking are important for a multitude of reasons. One could
hypothesize that increased time taken by fathers away from work would result in a higher
amount of childcare work taken up by them. Another plausible outcome could be that the
overall hours of childcare labor increases, but the percentage of the total burden still falls
primarily on the mother.

45

Another limitation of the study is the failure to isolate the effect of paid parental leave provided
by private companies. As competition to hire more productive workers intensifies over time,
companies are incentivized to increase the benefits offered in compensation packages, including
but not limited to paid parental leave. However, there is no way to discern whether the paid
leave available to the parent is offered at the state or firm level. This creates a potential
downward bias toward zero; at the extreme, all private companies would offer paid leave and
the policy impact would thus be zero.
Another possible explanation for our results is that gender and deep-rooted patriarchal dynamics
discourage fathers from taking paid leave for fear of consequences, both at work and in their
social life. Further, it is hard to quantify and implement the ‘stickiness’ of social norms within
an econometric model, which is why it is not discussed in our case study. Nevertheless, if the
prevailing gender dynamics that remain in the U.S. are able to be overcome and paid leave is
utilized, there can be meaningful strides made toward true gender equality.
10.2 Positive Outcomes From Incentivizing Fathers’ Involvement
By drawing fathers into the daily realities of childcare, free of workplace constraints, paid time
off provides the space necessary for fathers to develop the parenting skills, gain a sense of
responsibility, and fully engage with the early stages of parenting, which then allows them to be
active co-parents (Marshall 2008; Rehel 2014). There is no perfect substitute for hands-on
experience. Through this benefit fathers will be able to transition from that of a helper, to that
of an active co-parent. Indeed, taking paternity leave is associated with more equitable and more
skilled childcare after the leave is over, relinquishing some of the double burden that mothers
have been labored with (Haas 1990; Rehel 2014).
In terms of health outcomes, a father’s partaking in paid leave is shown to include a reduction in
maternal illness and depression and increase the mother’s well-being (Harrington et al 2014).
Involving fathers in policy eligibility has shown to improve sleep for the mother as well, since
fathers can take part of the childcare burden while their partner rests. If paid leave includes
fathers, it is also more likely that fathers will remain directly involved in the care of their
children in the longer term (National Partnership 2016).
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The research done on paid parental leave sparks the necessity for a conversation about the value
of care in general and childcare specifically. In a fair society, everyone would be offered an
equal amount of support to successfully care for a child. In a capitalist society, however, better
benefits are given to those who earn them, usually based on career choice, education, or access
to opportunity. Indeed, many prominent private firms offer extended paid leave with 100%
wage replacement for new parents who would like to take time away from work and bond with
their newborn. Even so, we’ve seen other countries with capitalist society offer much more
support to new parents while the United States continues to let the burden of child rearing fall
solely on parents, valuing childcare at zero dollars. Future discussion should undoubtedly focus
on the true impact that mothers have contributed to society through their production of the
future workforce.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A1
Norway’s Ministry of Labour grants forty-six weeks of parental leave with 100% of earnings
replacement, or fifty-six weeks of parental leave with 80% of earnings replacement, to eligible
parents to care for and bond with a newborn or newly adopted child. of the post-natal period,
fifteen weeks are the fathers’ quota and fifteen weeks are the mothers’ quota. The remaining 16
or 26 weeks is a family entitlement and may be taken by either mother or father, or a
combination of both (Brandth 2018).
They offer 13 weeks of maternity leave separately to cover three weeks before the birth and ten
weeks following birth. It is obligatory for mothers to take six weeks leave after birth for health
reasons. Fathers are separately granted two weeks of unpaid leave by government, nicknamed
‘daddy days.’ While they are unpaid by government, payment can depend on individual or
collective agreements and most employed fathers are covered by such agreements (Brandth
2018).
Norway’s parental leave is funded through general taxation. There is an upper bound limit on
benefits of six times the basic national insurance benefit per month. It is possible to postpone
parts of the parental leave as long as it is taken during the first three years after birth and the
parent receiving the benefit is employed full time during the postponement period. To be
eligible, one must be employed for at least six of the last ten months prior to birth and earn at
least half the basic national insurance benefit payment over the previous year. For fathers to take
leave using the family entitlement, the mother is required to take up work or study (at least 75%
of full-time hours) (Brandth 2018).
Appendix A2
New Jersey’s Family Leave Insurance replaces 66% of workers’ wages when they have to stop
working to care for a loved one with a physical or mental health condition, to handle certain
matters related to domestic or sexual violence, or to bond with a newborn, newly adopted, or
newly placed foster child. To be eligible, one must have either earned $12,000 total or $240
weekly for 20 weeks total in the 18 months prior to the start of the claim. Employers must
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participate in the State Family Leave Insurance plan and deduct payroll taxes for it, or provide a
private plan. In addition, birthing parents can receive Temporary Disability Insurance benefits
when they stop working before giving birth, and while recovering (NJ Department of Labor and
Workforce Development).
Appendix A3
California’s Paid Family Leave replaces 60% to 70% of one’s prior salary while eligible
workers take off to bond with a new child (either by birth, adoption, or foster care placement),
to care for a seriously ill family member, or to participate in a qualifying event resulting from a
family member’s military deployment to a foreign country. The program provides up to eight
weeks of benefits and does not have to be taken all at once. To be eligible, one must be covered
by State Disability Insurance (or a private plan in lieu) and have earned at least $300 in the past
5 to 18 months (Employment Development Department: State of California 2020).
Appendix A4
R is employed for all editing of data, statistical computing and graphics. First, the variable for
sex is turned into a binary outcome variable for males and females, with 0 and 1, respectively
(previously the binary was 2/1).
A similar procedure is followed for spouspres, which identifies whether a spouse or partner is
present within the household. A subset of the data is then created to only include observations
where the person surveyed had a partner or spouse present in the household with them for the
purpose of understanding the division of labor between two adults after the implementation of
mandated paid leave. Following this step, we remove irrelevant columns of data.
The variable hh_child was used to create another subset that identifies whether a child is present
in the household, essential for childcare. Thus, the subset includes only observations with a
child present in the household.
We also limit the age of the youngest child in the household to less than 6 years of age using the
variable ageychild. The assumption is that children younger than 6 require more parental
attention and parents with children over this age would experience similar employment trends
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regardless of the implementation of a paid family leave, since their children are likely to be in
school or have other forms of childcare.
For omitted variables, we replace inputs with NA. This is only conducted for the variable
earnweek (weekly earnings), which has some inputs as 99999.99 to represent a missing
observation. We do this so as not to skew the coefficient estimations. Some survey applicants
stated they earned $0 weekly; we drop these observations as it is difficult to justify working for
no pay and its implications on what employment truly is from an outside perspective. Further,
this is needed to transform earnweek into a logarithmic function and more easily interpret
increases in weekly wages.
Since the eligibility requirement for paid parental leave is to hold a job, our data must only
include employed persons. The variable empstat originally had 5 different outcomes, but we
adjusted them to group together both “employed – present” and “employed – absent,” and then
exclude those either unemployed or not looking for work. Workers are only eligible for paid
time off through insurance programs that are tied to one’s employer.
The education variable educyrs is cleaned up and recounted so that it is recorded as a discrete
variable, rather than a categorical variable. An increase in years of education from, say, 12 to 13
years is now recorded as 12 and 13, respectively, rather than identification code 217 and
identification code 300. The first step was to identify the code descriptions. Then, we used
Microsoft Excel to index-match the original identification code to the years of educational
attainment in a counting format. This is done to interpret the variable more easily in the software
program.
The time-use variable for household childcare, denoted as hhchildcare, aggregates the total
daily time that the member of the household spends on tending to the child’s needs. That
includes, but is not limited to, the child’s education and health, which is commonly classified as
primary childcare. The variable is measured in minutes, with a range of 0 to 1440 – or 24 hours.
After creating the time-use variable, we aggregate its minutes with another variable that assesses
time spent on secondary childcare to create a new, final dependent variable: total_cc, which is
the total time spent on childcare, measured in minutes per day. Secondary childcare here is
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defined as childcare in which the parent is supervising the child but can multitask in the
situation. It is not record if the activity is sleeping, however. For easier interpretation, we then
divide this variable by 60 and multiply by 7 to obtain the total hours spent weekly on any
childcare labor. The final variable is called cchrperweek and is the dependent variable in each
model.
Appendix A5
In a canonical difference-in-differnce model, there are two units and two time periods, with one
of the units being treated in the second period. Under the parallel trends assumption that, ceteris
paribus, the two units would have the same change in the outcome variable, the treatment effect
is equal to the difference in the outcome variable for the treated unit in period 2 and the treated
unit in period 1, less the same difference in the control unit.
Mathematically, this can be shown as:
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Where T represents the treated group, C represents the control group, 2 is the post-treatment
period, and 1 is the pre-treatment period. The difference between the treated group’s change
across time from the control group’s change across time is the resulting estimate (Baker 2019;
Cunningham 2021; Goodman-Bacon 2021).
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